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Abstract 
 
Peter Godfrey-Smith’s introduction to the philosophy of biology is excellent. This 
review questions one implication of that book, namely that Darwin’s case for the 
efficacy of natural selection was hampered by his ignorance of the particulate 
nature of inheritance. I suggest, instead, that Darwin was handicapped by an 
inability to effectively engage in quantitative population thinking. I also question 
Godfrey-Smith’s understanding of the role that Malthusian struggle plays in 
linking natural selection to the origination of new adaptive traits, and I raise 
problems for his defence of apparently unproblematic conceptions of human 
nature. Finally, I highlight the welcome conception of a ‘philosophy of nature’ 
developed by Godfrey-Smith.  
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Peter Godfrey-Smith has written a lovely introduction to our subject. There is a 
great deal to like about his new book, and far less to complain about than a 
reviewer might hope for. Philosophy of Biology is limpid. Not only is it beautifully 
written, it also manages to convey the basic structure of several technical issues 
in an unfussy and intuitive manner that will engage even the least 
mathematically minded of readers. It is simultaneously balanced and 
opinionated: it allows a newcomer to the subject to appreciate the strengths of 
differing positions, while offering refreshing and decisive answers to 
philosophical questions. It is short enough to offer a swift overview of the sorts 
of questions that concern us, but it takes enough time to develop (albeit in 
skeletal form) claims that will intrigue seasoned professionals. It gives a sense of 
the historical development of biology and of philosophical responses to it, and 
yet its concerns are up-to-date. 
 
Let me now develop some more critical lines of reflection. As an introduction, it 
is inevitable that Philosophy of Biology leaves out, or slides over, details that one 
might linger over in a treatment aimed at a different audience. So the worries 
that follow do not detract from the quality of a book of this kind. I begin with 
qualms about Godfrey-Smith’s understanding of natural selection, before briefly 
making trouble for his comments about human nature. I will return to gushing 
praise at the end of the review. 
 
What Darwin Didn’t Know 
 
There is a general consensus among historians that while Darwin quickly 
convinced his scientific peers that the history of life could be represented as a 
great tree, he was much less successful in persuading them that natural selection 
was the primary explanation for this pattern, or indeed that natural selection 
was an important process at all. But what sort of facts, or what sort of reasoning, 
might have enabled Darwin to convince his sceptical audience? What was it, 
precisely, that Darwin didn’t know? 
 
Very early in his book Godfrey-Smith gives a précis of this historical orthodoxy, 
before offering a quick remark about Darwin’s failings:1 
 
Most biologists were fairly quickly convinced that evolution (as we now 
call it) had occurred, and that common ancestry connects much or all of 
life on earth. There was more controversy about how the process had 
happened, especially about natural selection and Darwin’s insistence on 
gradual change. One of the weaker points in Darwin’s work was his 
understanding of reproduction and inheritance… (p. 9) 
 
We are then treated to a swift canter through Mendel’s work, the modern 
synthesis, and the discovery of the structure of DNA. Ninety pages later, Godfrey-
Smith offers a brief description of one of the major landmarks of the modern 
synthesis. R.A. Fisher, he tells us, ‘argued in 1930 that inheritance had to operate 
in a “particulate” manner, with discrete and stable genes, in order for sustained 
Darwinian evolution to be possible’ (p. 97). 
 
Putting all of these comments together, the reader might come away with the 
impression that Mendel, Watson and Crick helped biologists to understand—
dimly at first, but later with a much clearer material basis—that inheritance was 
a matter of the passing on of discrete material particles. This conception of 
inheritance as particulate would then turn out to explain how, at Fisher’s hands, 
a case could finally be made for the efficacy of selection. Darwin’s shaky 
understanding of ‘reproduction and inheritance’ can then be understood as his 
ignorance of the material nature of the inheritance process. Godfrey-Smith may 
not intend to convey this message, but many readers will conclude from these 
remarks that what Darwin didn’t know was that inheritance was particulate. 
 
There are reasons to doubt the history of biology as reconstructed in the 
preceding paragraph. Although Fisher did indeed claim that ‘one of the main 
difficulties felt by Darwin is resolved by the particulate theory’ (1930, p. 12), he 
                                                        
1 All page references are to Philosophy of Biology unless otherwise indicated. 
did not argue that natural selection could not possibly work if it took place in a 
context of blending inheritance. Instead, Fisher argued that: 
 
The important consequence of the blending is that, if not safeguarded by 
intense marital correlation, the heritable variance is approximately 
halved in every generation…If variability persists, as Darwin rightly 
inferred, causes of new variability must continually be at work. Almost 
every individual of each generation must be a mutant… (1930, p. 5) 
 
In other words, if inheritance follows a blending pattern, then for selection to be 
efficacious it must also be the case that like organisms mate with like, or that 
new variations are constantly arising, or both. Darwin seemed to think that 
assumptions much like these two were in fact satisfied (Lewens 2010). He 
thought that the struggle for existence was frequently so intense that only the 
very best adapted individuals would survive, hence they would end up mating 
with each other. And he held the view that ‘sports’—that is, rare variations, of 
large magnitude—were of little significance for evolutionary change when 
compared with ‘individual differences’. These were the ‘many slight differences’ 
which Darwin thought regularly appeared in populations (Lewens 2010, 
Vorzimmer 1963).  
 
How did Darwin go about explaining inheritance? His hypothesis of pangenesis, 
first published in his 1868 work The Variation of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication, laid out a provisional mechanism. He took the view that all the 
cells in the body: ‘throw off minute granules which are dispersed throughout the 
whole system…They are collected from all parts of the system to constitute the 
sexual elements, and their development in the next generation forms a new 
being’ (Darwin 1868). So Darwin did think that inheritance involved the 
transmission of particles, yet this conviction did not help him to convert sceptics 
about natural selection. Pangenesis was barely mentioned in the editions of the 
Origin that appeared after 1868, indicating that Darwin himself seemed to think 
that his views about the particulate basis of inheritance were irrelevant to the 
case he tried to make for natural selection (Peckham 1959). 
 What Darwin needed to make a case for selection’s efficacy was not a hypothesis 
about the material processes underpinning inheritance. It was a way of linking a 
set of claims about patterns of resemblance between offspring and their parents 
to a set of claims about the changing constitution of populations. Darwin 
gestured to one way of doing this—perhaps selection can work if variation is 
constantly springing up, and the struggle for existence is supremely intense—but 
he never developed a rigorous way to make this argument. Fisher developed a 
rigorous approach, and he concluded on that basis that Darwin’s scheme for 
selection had implausible empirical consequences. But Darwin’s failings were 
not so much a matter of ignorance that inheritance works in a certain way, as a 
matter of ignorance of how to engage in a certain form of quantitative 
‘population thinking’. 
 
We have seen that, on Fisher’s view, a particulate conception of inheritance could 
solve problems faced by blending views. Fisher wrote that it was ‘universally 
admitted’ that ‘Darwin accepted the fusion or blending theory of inheritance’ 
(1930, p. 1). But we have also seen that Darwin thought that offspring acquired a 
set of particles from their parents, passed on at conception, which matured in 
such a way as to explain trans-generational resemblance. There is evidently no 
contradiction in thinking that offspring traits are usually intermediate between 
those of their parents, while adding that the transmission of particles is what 
explains this. This raises the question of what one might mean by contrasting 
‘blending’ inheritance with ‘particulate’ inheritance as Fisher did.  
 
In Fisher’s case the nature of the difference is clear. When he demonstrated ‘the 
great contrast between the blending and the particulate theories of inheritance’ 
(1930, p. 4), his exploration of the consequences of blending focused purely on 
what we might think of as phenomenal patterns of inheritance. Fisher 
entertained no theory of the mechanism that might underlie such an inheritance 
system. Instead, he showed us how quickly variance will disappear in a system 
whereby offspring trait values are always intermediate between the values of the 
parents. He then contrasted this purely phenomenal model with a system 
whereby offspring trait values follow what he called ‘the modern scheme of 
Mendelian or factorial inheritance’ (p. 7). 
 
Evidently a population characterised by Fisher’s simple blending model will 
behave differently to a population that follows a Mendelian scheme. In a simple 
blending model, for example, the offspring of a given pair of parents are always 
identical, and reversion is impossible. In the Mendelian case, phenotypic values 
of siblings can differ, and phenotypes can disappear for a generation before 
reappearing again. Fisher argued that ‘the mechanism of particulate inheritance’ 
results in ‘no inherent tendency for the variability to diminish’ (p. 9). But if a 
phenomenology of blending inheritance can be articulated without spelling out 
the material mechanism that underlies it, we must ask whether a contrasting 
phenomenology of Mendelian inheritance can also be neutral regarding the 
underlying mechanism that sustains it. Of course, the mere claim that inheritance 
follows a Mendelian pattern tells us nothing about the precise material 
constitution of the particles transmitted from parents to offspring. But we can 
also ask whether Mendelian inheritance requires that we think of inheritance in 
terms of the transmission of particles at all. 
 
There is evidence that Mendel himself seems not to have understood the 
‘elements’, which determined the makeup of his peas, as particles. Our modern 
notation represents homozygotes as AA or aa, and heterozygotes as Aa. Each 
token ‘A’ or ‘a’ represents some sort of discrete material token, which must be 
matched with a similar or dissimilar token. Mendel’s notation was different: 
what we would now call the heterozygote was still represented as Aa, but the 
pure-breeding offspring of hybrids—what we would now call the 
homozygotes—were represented as A or a simpliciter (Olby 1979). Perhaps 
Mendel thought of yellow-making factor in pea plants as a kind of fluid, which 
might be present in an unadulterated form—A—or in combination with an 
alternative immiscible green-making fluid—Aa.  
 
William Bateson offers a more intriguing case. Bateson was, of course, Mendel’s 
great early champion. And yet, in spite of Bateson’s enthusiastic claims that plant 
breeders can ‘take out greenness and put in yellowness; you can take out 
hairiness and put in dwarfness’, it is not clear that he thought of genes as discrete 
material particles (Bateson 1904). Like some John Dupré avant la lettre, Bateson 
took the view that organisms were best understood in dynamic, processual 
terms (Dupré 2012). ‘A living creature’, wrote Bateson, ‘is a vortex of chemical 
and molecular change…We commonly think of plants and animals as matter, but 
they are really systems through which matter is continuously passing.’2 
 
This stress on the power of processes, rather than the power of materials, was 
carried over to genes themselves. He denied that genes were located on 
chromosomes, suggesting instead that they might be some sort of ‘gel’. The 
constitution of these gels would then be understood by the physics of vortices. 
This physics would explain in dynamic terms the potential of genes to undergo 
abrupt shifts, as well as their stability over generations: ‘I incline to the 
expectation that the heterogeneity of the determining elements as factors lies 
rather in forces, of which the materials are the vehicle, than in the nature of the 
material itself.’ 
 
This excursion into the arcana of Mendel and Bateson shows that there have 
been Mendelians—i.e. persons who stress the importance of Mendelian ratios for 
understanding the fluctuating makeups of populations over generations—who 
have denied that inheritance is a matter of the passing on of particles. That 
reinforces the thought that if Darwin was held back by anything, it was a failure 
to develop a rigorous analysis of the changing composition of traits in 
populations, rather than a failure to link inheritance with the transmission of 
particles. Even Fisher, in stressing the importance for selection of the 
preservation of variance in a population, places weight on the first populational 
task rather than the second mechanical one. 
 
                                                        
2 This and the proceeding quotations from Bateson are all taken from Rushton 
(2014). For further detail on Bateson see Radick (2011; 2013). 
These points might seem like pedantic corrections to Godfrey-Smith’s casual 
historical asides. But they underline an important claim Godfrey-Smith makes 
immediately after his comment about Fisher’s insistence that inheritance ‘had to 
operate in a “particulate” manner’. He argues that modern genomics suggests 
that there may be no particulate genes of the sort that Fisher imagined: 
 
The point is not merely that genes are more indefinite and blurry entities 
than had been supposed; it has to do with why they are less particle-like. 
Genomes, at least in organisms like us, are more organized entities, with 
large proportions of an organism’s DNA engaged in subtle processes of 
regulation of the expression of “coding” regions. New genomes are made 
by combining large chunks of this genetic material from the genomes of 
each parent, and this is not much like shuffling a collection of alleles and 
stringing some together on a line. (p. 97) 
 
In stressing our increasing understanding of the genome as a resource for 
inheritance that can be variably reemployed and reconfigured, Godfrey-Smith 
points to ways in which, when viewed close up, genes do not look much like 
particles. He also reminds us that ‘objects that look indefinite and vague up close 
can become usably sharp once you are looking from further away’, so that ‘when 
we look at change over a long period in the entire species, genes come into focus 
and evolution does look like change in allele frequencies’ (98-9). I have tried to 
suggest here that this combination of scepticism about the particulate nature of 
genes when viewed in their fine material details, along with an enthusiastic 
endorsement of trans-generational change as a matter of shifting combinations 
of alleles, could already be discerned in the work of early Mendelians like 
Bateson. 
 
Malthus and Selection 
 
Darwin introduced the concept of natural selection in order to explain the 
phenomena of adaptation. It is essential for this task that Darwin’s mechanism 
does not merely explain why beneficial traits, once they arise, might become 
widely distributed in a population. Darwin also took it that natural selection 
could explain why beneficial adaptations come to exist in the first place. If 
natural selection cannot discharge this role, it is unclear how natural selection is 
supposed to be an alternative to special creation. For, on the face of things, if 
natural selection can only tell us why wonderful adaptations like eyes spread 
through populations if they happen to arise as novel variants, we are still faced 
with the question of how something as intricate as an eye appears in the first 
place. Natural selection is supposed to answer demands for origin explanations, 
as well as demands for distribution explanations. 
 
If natural selection is a force that can increase trait frequencies, how can 
selection also explain the origination of beneficial adaptations? It must turn out, 
as Godfrey-Smith explains, that by increasing trait frequencies, selection makes 
the emergence of further adaptations more likely. Several writers have shown 
how this can happen, and Godfrey-Smith endorses the basic schema (see, for 
example, Neander 1995, Lewens 2004). Suppose that genomic bases X, Y and Z 
produce eyes of increasing functionality. Suppose, also, that it is more likely that 
Z will be produced by mutation from Y, than it is that Z will be produced by 
mutation from X. Now, suppose that Y appears by chance mutation in a 
population of organisms with X. And suppose that natural selection favours Y, 
and increases the number of organisms with Y in the population. Selection has 
now made it more likely that Z will appear, by increasing the number of 
organisms with Y. Selection has explained the origination of a more functional 
eye. 
 
Godfrey-Smith spots an important ambiguity in the way this sort of story is 
sometimes presented. One reads that selection makes ‘eye precursors more 
common. But “common” is ambiguous—a trait might become more common in 
relative terms or in absolute terms’ (p. 41). Selection is usually thought of as 
increasing the frequency of one trait over another. If the chances of Z appearing 
are to be increased by selection, then it must turn out that selection increases the 
absolute number of organisms with Y. Selection need not act in this way, even 
though it sometimes might do, because Y might increase its frequency over X 
even when the absolute numbers of both are declining. 
 
What I find puzzling in Godfrey-Smith’s account is his appeal to the Malthusian 
struggle over scarce resources in the context of origin explanations (see also 
Godfrey-Smith 2009). I have already given my own account of the role intense 
struggle has for Darwin. If resources are scarce then (Darwin proposes) the 
intense competition that results means that very slight anatomical differences 
can give advantages that determine who lives and who dies. And if all but the 
very best adapted perish, then selection will not be so retarded by unconstrained 
mating, for less adapted organisms will not survive to sexual maturity. In these 
respects, struggle accentuates the acuity and the efficacy of selection in 
promoting adaptation (Lewens 2010). 
 
Godfrey-Smith suggests something different, namely that ‘the fact of scarce 
resources—when it is a fact—ties relative reproductive success and absolute 
reproductive success together’ (p. 42). What he appears to be saying is that when 
resources are scarce the type whose frequency is increasing is necessarily 
increasing in absolute numbers, too. But if resources are exceptionally scarce, all 
types might be decreasing in absolute numbers, some more quickly than others. 
We will still find that the more successful type increases its frequency over the 
others (until all become extinct). So scarce resources do not tie relative 
reproductive success to absolute success. 
 
In earlier work on this issue I suggested that we might do better to think of 
selection as increasing the efficiency of search in a population (Lewens 2004). 
Let us return to our example of eyes. In circumstances of exceptionally scarce 
resources we might find that the overall chances that a Z variant will appear in a 
population are decreasing, because the absolute number of Y variants is also 
decreasing, albeit less quickly than the number of X variants. In these 
circumstances, selection increases the frequency of Y even as Y’s numbers 
decline. But we must remember that our population—even if it is shrinking—is 
more likely to produce a Z variant if it is composed primarily of Y variants than if 
it is composed primarily of X variants. Selection explains adaptation in 
circumstances of exceptionally scarce resources, in the sense that the chances of 
Z arising are higher if Y increases its frequency than they would have been if X 
had increased its frequency. This is compatible with the fact that the chances of Z 
arising are decreasing over time, because of extremely scarce of resources. 
Understood in one way, selection increases the chances of adaptation in this 
scenario; understood in another way, selection decreases those chances. 
 
Human Nature 
 
I now turn to some brief remarks on Godfrey-Smith’s equally brief comments on 
the notion human nature. Evolution, as he puts it, is ‘open-ended’ (p. 141). Traits 
that are now rare might become common; traits that are now common might 
become rare. Moreover, as we understand developmental processes better we 
can learn how to quickly change widely distributed traits that until now have 
been thought inevitable. So whatever ‘human nature’ might be, we should not 
think of it as strongly fixed. Even so, Godfrey-Smith is relaxed about weaker 
approaches to the human nature concept. He points out that Martians could put 
together something like a field-guide to our planet’s flora and fauna. It might 
feature an entry on Homo sapiens. ‘In that sense, there is surely nothing mythical 
about the idea of human nature’ (p. 140). A few sentences later he suggests that 
‘there is nothing problematic in talking of the “nature” of the human species, in a 
low-key way. As a result of our evolutionary history, there is a genetic profile 
that is characteristic of our species, which includes important causes of many of 
our distinctive traits.’ (p. 140)  
 
I agree that Martians could put together a field guide with a usable entry on 
humans. But field guides enable us to assign individual organisms to their proper 
species when we are out in the field. That is why real field guides include 
information about characteristic bird song even when that song is learnt, and 
that is why field guides do not include information about genes, because genes 
are hard to observe (Lewens 2012). So the entry on Homo sapiens in a Martian 
field guide might include pieces of information like ‘wears removable clothes’, 
‘watches television’, ‘lives in large artificial dwellings’, and so forth, for these are 
very good (albeit imperfect) diagnostic features of our species members, and 
they are fairly easy to observe. This first diagnostic notion of human nature as 
‘things one might see in a field guide entry’ is evidently not the same as the 
second notion of ‘a genetic profile that is characteristic of our species, which 
includes important causes of many of our distinctive traits’. Wearing removable 
clothing may be diagnostic of Homo sapiens, but it cannot be linked in any 
straightforward way to a characteristic genetic profile. 
 
Godfrey-Smith does not flag to readers how different these two notions of human 
nature are, which suggests the concept may harbour ambiguities that are 
problematic by virtue of going unnoticed. It is also easy to raise worries for the 
second notion of human nature. Recall that he gestures to ‘a genetic profile that 
is characteristic of our species, which includes important causes of many of our 
distinctive traits.’ Our species might have a distinctive genetic profile that 
derives from non-coding regions of the genome; some of our distinctive 
phenotypic traits may have important causes that are not genetic but epigenetic; 
many very widely distributed emotional traits, which evolutionary psychologists 
would reckon part of ‘human nature’, may not be distinctively human, but they 
may instead be shared with related species. All of this should make us wonder 
what purpose is served by defining human nature along the lines sketched in 
Godfrey-Smith’s second account. I see more problems in these conceptions of 
human nature than Godfrey-Smith does. 
 
The Philosophy of Nature 
 
Let me close by accentuating the positive. A consistent and important feature of 
this book is that it is recognisably philosophical. One cannot decide what is to 
count as a major evolutionary transition, or what the explanatory value of 
Hamilton’s rule might be, or whether species are arbitrary groupings we impose 
for the sake of communicative convenience rather than evolutionary actors 
whose existence is independent of taxonomists’ practical concerns, merely by 
carrying out well designed experiments. One also needs to engage in some 
abstract reflection concerning what would count as evidence in favour of 
different answers to these questions, and whether the questions have intelligible 
presuppositions in the first place. Biologists themselves care about these 
questions, and it is greatly to the credit of our subject that philosophers have 
helped to answer them in constructive ways. But if we place too much stress on 
an image of the philosophy of biology as a discipline continuous with theoretical 
biology, and largely in the service of biology’s own conceptual worries, we risk 
obliterating a more directly philosophical set of concerns that are thrown up by 
biological work. 
 
The work of biologists can be usefully integrated into a variety of debates about 
(among other things) the relationship of humans to nature more generally; about 
the ability of contingent, fallible creatures to understand the fundamental 
structure of the universe; about the broad nature of causal relations, and of 
natural laws; and about how to place puzzling phenomena of morality and 
meaning in the world as we understand it. We should not be too concerned that 
many biologists worry only a little about these questions. If philosophers see 
their successes as fully measured by the degree to which they are participant in 
the active projects of biologists we also face the possibility—which some will see 
as a risk, others as a blessing—that philosophers of biology will become 
detached from the concerns of their mainstream philosophical colleagues, and 
that their conversations will increasingly target scientists, rather than workers 
in the humanities. 
 
Godfrey-Smith spends much of this book addressing the ways in which 
philosophy can shed light on problems that trouble biologists. Thankfully, he also 
makes room for a project that he calls ‘the philosophy of nature’: an attempt to 
‘understand the universe and our place within it’ (p. 4). The philosophy of 
biology, when undertaken in this mode, ‘is not giving a philosophical report of 
what is going on in science, but working out what the raw science is really telling 
us, and using it to put together an overall picture of the world’ (p. 4). This brings 
the philosophy of biology back into alignment with the concerns of our 
philosophical colleagues. His fine book gives encouragement to those of us who 
consider ourselves philosophers first and foremost. 
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